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Abstract
International environmental negotiations often involve conﬂicts between developed and
developing countries. However, considering environmental cooperation in a North-South
dichotomy obscures important variation within the Global South, particularly as emerg-
ing economies become more important politically, economically, and environmentally.
This article examines change in the Southern coalition in environmental negotiations,
using the recently concluded Minamata Convention on Mercury as its primary case.
Focusing on India and China, we argue that three key factors explain divergence in their
positions as the negotiations progressed: domestic resources and regulatory politics, de-
velopment constraints, and domestic scientiﬁc and technological capacity. We conclude
that the intersection between scientiﬁc and technological development and domestic
policy is of increasing importance in shaping emerging economies’ engagement in inter-
national environmental negotiations. We also discuss how this divergence is affecting
international environmental cooperation on other issues, including the ozone and climate
negotiations.
Global environmental negotiations scholars have largely analyzed two major
negotiating blocs: developed countries or the Global North, and developing
countries or the Global South (Joshi 2013). Research has explored differences
within the North—for example, contrasting the EU and US’s positions in the
climate change and ozone negotiations (Downie 2014; Fisher 2004; Hoffmann
2005). However, the global environmental politics literature, largely based in
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the North, has paid less attention to differences within the South. Yet, as countries
in the South begin to diverge in their development trajectories, their interests
and preferences are also changing. This is particularly the case for emerging
economies, most notably China and India.
Developing countries and emerging economies have historically coopera-
ted in international negotiations, often through large coalitions such as the
Group of 77 (G77) plus China (Najam et al. 2003). At the Rio Earth Summit
in 1992, where the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
was negotiated, developing countries worked together to successfully argue for
several principles, including common but differentiated responsibilities. This
pattern of Southern cooperation continued through numerous UNFCCC Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) meetings on topics such as ﬁnancing, capacity
building, and targets and timetables. In the ozone negotiations, developing coun-
tries similarly took a common position on many issues. When ozone standards
were being strengthened in the mid-1990s, developing countries together argued
that tighter controls should be contingent on increased ﬁnancing (Parson 2003).
However, over time, these developing country alliances have frayed, par-
ticularly between two major emerging economies: China and India. In the
ozone regime, China has shown greater willingness to act on limiting hydro-
ﬂuorocarbons (HFCs), but India has resisted (Hwang 2013). On climate
change, China has enacted signiﬁcant domestic policies, including an emissions
trading system, and has announced a bilateral climate agreement with the US.
By contrast, India has enacted less ambitious domestic climate policies, commit-
ting to reductions in intensity rather than absolute reductions, and its coopera-
tion with the US is limited.
Although other scholars have pointed to growing divergence in the South,
it is not clear why this is happening. Why has cooperation between these emerg-
ing economies, with previously similar perspectives on the environment and
development, changed over time? In this article, we explain this divergence
empirically and explore its implications for future international negotiations.
We focus on China and India, who often play a large role within negotiations
and whose decisions on global environmental issues can have substantial
impacts. We argue that domestic resources and regulatory politics, development
constraints, and domestic scientiﬁc and technological capacity all help explain
the increasing divergence in China’s and India’s negotiating positions over time.
This article uses the Minamata Convention on Mercury, as the most recent,
successful example of international environmental cooperation, to examine un-
derlying interests, preferences, and their temporal evolution. Evidence is drawn
from meeting documents, technical reports, scientiﬁc assessments, the UN En-
vironment Programme (UNEP), national governments, and the Earth Negotia-
tions Bulletin (ENB). Further information was gathered from participant
observation at the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) sessions
on mercury and interviews with the individuals and delegates involved in the
negotiations.
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In the next section, we provide a theoretical background, followed by an
overview of themercury negotiations, including how India’s and China’s positions
have changed over time. Next, we explain why this divergence in positions
occurred. Although we developed this argument using evidence from the mercury
regime, we argue that it may generalize to other regimes, including climate and
ozone. We conclude by discussing the implications for theory and practice in
international environmental cooperation.
Developing Countries’ Positions in Global Negotiations
Developing countries have historically cooperated and crafted common posi-
tions, despite differences in interests, to achieve more favorable outcomes.
The global environmental politics literature has largely treated developing coun-
tries as a collective within international environmental negotiations (Hoffmann
2005; Roberts and Parks 2007). Examining ozone, biodiversity, and the hazard-
ous waste trade, Miller (1998) characterized Third World countries as a negoti-
ating bloc throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Building on her work, Williams
(2005) argued that this grouping continued to have relevance within interna-
tional environmental negotiations in the 2000s. In the climate negotiations,
Najam, Huq, and Sokona (2003) argued that developing countries share com-
mon interests, including securing an equitable architecture, enhancing capacities,
and pursuing sustainable development. The G77 is a key venue for this cooper-
ation, and internal negotiations within the South-South collective push the
group toward common positions (Najam 2004).
However, it is increasingly unclear whether this dichotomy continues to
accurately capture negotiating dynamics. In the development literature, the
North-South model has been critiqued for ignoring heterogeneity among
Southern countries (Eckl and Weber 2007; Therien 1999). In environmental
negotiations, scholars have documented divergence in the Southern group on
climate policy—between OPEC and the G77, and between emerging economies
and least developed countries (Barnett 2008; Roberts 2011). Perkins (2013)
characterized the developing world as increasingly diverse in terms of develop-
ment, governance capacities, and power in negotiations. Najam (2005) also
hypothesized that developing countries’ pursuit of speciﬁc national interests
might magnify as global environmental politics moves from a declaratory stage
toward a more substantive regulatory phase.
The role of China and India as emerging powers in global environmental
governance has drawn particular attention (Humphrey and Messner 2006). Re-
search has focused on tensions between emerging economies’ negotiating posi-
tions and how parties’ interests have shaped the Southern coalition’s behavior
(Hochstetler and Milkoreit 2014). The climate regime, which has not yet resulted
in substantive commitments from the developing world, has received signiﬁcant
focus. Examining India’s position in the climate negotiations, Joshi (2013) ar-
gued that the North and South are “ﬂuid and dynamic categories” and that these
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groups ﬂuctuate between unity and plurality, depending on geopolitical and devel-
opment factors. Despite this ﬂuidity, however, she argues that North-South distinc-
tions retain their importance, with the Indian delegation emphasizing historical
differences between the developed and developing worlds as a negotiating strategy.
Some research has focused speciﬁcally on the Minamata Convention on
Mercury, as an example of a recent international regime. Selin (2014a) showed
that linkages with other international environmental regimes affected the mer-
cury negotiation. Templeton and Kohler (2014) argued that developing coun-
tries worked together in negotiations to secure a commitment for new ﬁnancing.
These studies demonstrated that the Minamata Convention represents a useful
case through which to examine larger issues of coalitions and consensus in in-
ternational environmental politics. Like other environmental regimes, such as
climate and ozone, the developed world has been responsible for the majority
of historic mercury emissions, but emerging economies are currently the largest
emitters. Minamata also offers a case that has progressed from negotiation to a
legally binding agreement, allowing us to examine changes in coalition dynamics
as regulatory requirements become more concrete.
India’s and China’s Positions in the Mercury Negotiations
Although mercury is naturally occurring, human emissions have increased its
presence in the environment (Giang and Selin 2016). Exposure to mercury,
which often occurs through ﬁsh consumption, can lead to adverse health effects.
The main motivations for a global mercury treaty were human health impacts
and emissions transporting globally (UNEP 2002; UNEP 2008). In its most
recent assessment, UNEP estimated that the largest anthropogenic sources of mer-
cury emissions are artisanal and small-scale goldmining (ASGM) (37 percent) and
fossil fuel combustion (25 percent); however, emissions data for ASGM remain
highly uncertain (UNEP 2013).
In the early 2000s, a large Southern coalition cooperated in the global
mercury negotiations through the UNEP Governing Council and Global Minis-
terial Environment Forum. The G77 and China argued that the existing chemi-
cals regime and voluntary measures were sufﬁcient, and that developing
countries knew little about mercury and had insufﬁcient capacity to address
the problem (ENB 2003). However, as negotiators considered developing a
legally binding agreement, countries organized into regional groups, such as
GRULAC (Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries) and the African
Group, with growing disagreements. Increasingly, the African Group supported
the EU’s interests in negotiating a binding agreement, viewing it as a pathway
toward ﬁnancial and technical support, including reducing mercury use in
ASGM. GRULAC, along with the US, was less willing to move forward.
As the two largest country emitters, India and China initially cooperated
and formed an inﬂuential coalition (ENB 2007b). In both countries, rapid eco-
nomic development drove emissions growth, through coal combustion, cement,
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and nonferrous metal production. Projections suggested that they would continue
to be the leading emitters. Given the substantial emissions from these two
countries alone, cooperation from both China and India was essential to
addressing mercury globally (Giang et al. 2015).
However, India and China argued against legally binding action in the
mid-2000s (ENB 2007b). Their tactics were to downplay the science and avail-
ability of alternatives to mercury and to limit the scope of the negotiations. They
both expressed skepticism that action was necessary and that abatement tech-
nology was feasible. Several negotiators from developed countries expressed
frustration that India, in particular, consistently argued for more baseline data
and questioned the science on mercury’s impacts on health and the environ-
ment (ENB 2005).1 China argued that a standalone treaty would be long and
unnecessarily arduous to negotiate. Both countries stressed the need for ﬂexibil-
ity and cited development goals, and the use of fossil fuels to attain these goals,
as the priority (Eriksen and Perrez 2014). On the issue of scope, both China and
India argued that mercury demand should be regulated rather than reduced,
and that trade in mercury-containing products should be excluded (ENB
2007a). They argued that eliminating atmospheric mercury emissions was not
economically and technically feasible.
By the mid-2000s, North-South coalitions were already beginning to break
down. The EU advocated for action alongside the African Group. The US and
other developed countries did not support a binding instrument. Consequently,
China, India, and the US, with support from other resistant countries, were able
to postpone global regulatory action on mercury for almost a decade. Only
when the US changed its position in 2009, after President Obama took ofﬁce,
did the negotiating dynamic alter (Selin 2014a). Still, China and India cooperated
to delay action on a legally binding instrument an additional year, moving the
start date for the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) process from
2009 to 2010.
At the ﬁrst and second INCmeetings, China and India signaled a continuing
alliance based on common interests. In one session, China’s negotiator referred to
his Indian counterpart as his “brother.”2 Substantively, China and India worked
together to issue joint proposals and cooperate. On atmospheric emissions, nei-
ther China nor India supported mandatory emissions targets or timelines, arguing
instead for a voluntary approach (ENB 2010a). China was unwilling to commit to
emissions reductions that might limit their growing energy sector, arguing that the
term control should be used. India emphasized the importance of common but
differentiated responsibilities and the need for ﬁnancial and technical assistance
for developing countries (ENB 2011a). Indian delegates asserted that technology
transfer would be necessary to comply with obligations to control emissions and
releases of mercury.
1. Interview with EU member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.
2. Personal observations, INC2.
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These common positions continued into the third and fourth INCs, where
draft text was formulated. These negotiations centered on voluntary versus
mandatory emissions standards, compliance, and ﬁnancial and technical assis-
tance (ENB 2011b). Both China and India stressed the importance of a ﬁnancial
mechanism. India emphasized that assistance from developed countries should
be mandatory. On compliance, India and China also cooperated, arguing that
any compliance article was contingent on both assistance and technology trans-
fer commitments. On emissions, India and China, along with Brazil, continued
to argue for weaker standards and a single approach for all emitters (ENB
2011a). Since these emerging economies all had signiﬁcant emissions, requiring
all countries to act would likely weaken the standards. By contrast, other devel-
oping countries, such as those in the African Group, argued that large emitters
should be considered separately. By this point, the African Group and GRULAC
tended to side with the EU, Norway, and other developed countries on many
issues. Thus, the negotiations were not based on a developed versus developing
country cleavage, but rather, a more complex blend of current and historic
emitters, and countries’ development status.
At INC4, China and India issued a joint submission that emphasized coal
electricity expansion for development, arguing against adopting the best avail-
able techniques (BAT) for existing facilities and mandatory emissions reduc-
tions. The document stated that the agreement should comprise both
voluntary and binding measures, specifying products and processes as one area
for ﬂexibility. This was particularly in China’s interests, given their large use of
mercury in manufacturing processes (Selin 2014a). Where requirements would
be binding, China and India’s joint submission called for ﬁnancial support.
Similarly, in statements at INC4, China stressed a voluntary and ﬂexible
approach, as well as consideration of the differing circumstances of developed
versus developing countries. India argued that the mercury regime should not
“encroach” on a climate regime by imposing stringent technology standards and
emphasized coal-based electriﬁcation’s importance for development (UNEP
2012).
Despite these strongly aligned positions, during the ﬁfth and ﬁnal INC,
Chinese negotiators made a sudden, clear, and unanticipated break with India.
The Chinese delegation stated that it was willing to accept more stringent mea-
sures on emissions.3 For new sources, China suddenly accepted mandatory con-
trol requirements, provided that parties were allowed to ﬂexibly choose
measures based on their own situation. For existing sources, China was also
more willing to accept timelines for controls.4 This willingness to compromise
allowed China to play a more active role in shaping the ﬁnal text. For example,
China argued that emissions should only cover major sources. This view was
3. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators, January 17 and February 4, 2014; and
with three UK negotiators, January 21, 2014.
4. Personal observations, INC5.
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incorporated into the ﬁnal text, which focused on major point source emissions.
It was clear that China had a broader negotiating mandate and was interested in
reaching an agreement. By contrast, India was less constructive at INC5, and was
reluctant to commit to implementing any emissions control technologies above
existing standards. India obstructed contact group attempts to operationalize
broad concepts like source thresholds. India also objected to forming a consen-
sus on ﬁnal negotiating packages regarding the mercury phase-out dates,
without China’s support.5
In the ﬁnal treaty, the emissions article called for parties to “control, and
where feasible, reduce” emissions of mercury, depending on whether the
sources were new or existing. For new emissions sources, BAT and best environ-
mental practices (BEP) would apply within ﬁve years of the treaty entering into
force. For existing sources, within ten years, parties would have to implement
one or more of the following options: emission limit values, BAT and BEP, a
multi-pollutant control strategy with co-beneﬁts for other air pollutants, or
alternative measures to reduce emissions.
In part because of India’s and other hesitant parties’ inﬂuence during the
negotiations, these requirements are relatively weak as compared to what the EU
and NGOs advocated. There are no quantiﬁed reduction targets, control rather
than reduction is required, and the timelines for action are far off, particularly
for existing sources (Selin 2014a). However, several negotiators from countries
favoring more stringent measures stated in interviews that they felt the ﬁnal text
was a good starting point; compromises were necessary for key emitters, like
China and India, to join the treaty.6 They also highlighted that requirements
could be ratcheted up in the Conference of Parties, as had occurred when other
chemicals agreements were implemented (Selin 2014b).
At theDiplomatic Conference formally adopting theMinamataConvention in
late 2013, China signed the treaty, and even provided ﬁnancial resources to support
other countries’ ratiﬁcation and implementation. In their statement, China empha-
sized their signiﬁcant domestic policy measures to address mercury pollution—for
example, adopting control standards equivalent to those in Germany. In contrast,
India did not attend the conference, and only signed the convention in late
2014, after a change in national government. Although India did not explain its
initial reluctance to join, its nonparticipation was criticized by domestic NGOs as
illustrating a lack of commitment to addressing the mercury issue (ENB 2013).
Explaining Divergence
How can we explain this divergence between China and India at the end of the
mercury negotiations, given that past scholarship would suggest a coalition
5. Interview with senior developed country negotiator, January 17, 2014.
6. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators January 17 and February 4, 2014; and
with an EU member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.
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would persist between these emerging economies? Since China and India con-
tinue to be large emitters, changes in their contributions to the problem are un-
likely to explain this change in positions. In fact, China has greater global
mercury emissions, suggesting it should bear greater costs and be less willing
to cooperate than India. Similarly, differences in the form of government—
authoritarian versus democratic—would suggest persistent differences rather than
changing coalitions over time. Instead, we argue that the divergence between
India’s and China’s positions was a function of three factors that can explain
changes over time: (1) domestic resources and regulatory politics, (2) develop-
ment constraints, and (3) domestic scientiﬁc and technological capacity.
Domestic Resources and Regulatory Politics
China and India have different resource endowments, in terms of both the type
and quality of domestic energy sources. As these resources have developed over
time, they have resulted in distinct domestic stationary combustion regulations.
In other words, there is an interaction between each country’s resources and the
resulting regulatory politics. In the mercury negotiations, key factors that varied
over time across India and China were the salience of air pollution domestically
and emissions control measures’ feasibility. Air pollution has become an impor-
tant political issue in China as signiﬁcant coal resources have been built. Con-
sequently, China has imposed tougher air quality regulations that concurrently
remove mercury. In India, fewer coal resources have been built, air quality
remains less politically salient, and the domestic coal resource quality creates
barriers to installing mercury control technology.
China was responsible for nearly half of global coal consumption in 2010,
more than four times India’s consumption (Yang and Cui 2012). During the
early mercury negotiations, China built more coal than India; in 2012, China
alone built 40 percent of new coal generation worldwide (Yang and Cui 2012).
However, in 2013, China installed more non-coal than coal sources, signaling
the beginning of a shift away from coal-based electricity (CEC 2013). In 2014,
China agreed to peak carbon emissions by 2030 through a bilateral pledge with
the US. In contrast, India is continuing to invest heavily in new coal, with plans
to add 160 GW of additional capacity by 2022, with projected coal consump-
tion growth to 2050 (ICEA 2012; National Institute for Public Health and the
Environment Netherlands 2001). Furthermore, China has signiﬁcant potential
shale resources, and India does not (US EIA 2013). In short, China has already
built its coal resources, whereas India has lagged behind and is signiﬁcantly
more resource constrained. Given new coal capacity, stringent requirements for
new sources under the Minamata Convention would have disproportionately
impacted India.
Coal resource quality also affected the link between mercury emissions
and urban air pollution in each country. Regulation of nitrogen oxides, sulfur
dioxide, and particulates—three traditional air pollutants—can lead to co-beneﬁts
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for mercury reduction, because control technologies capturing these pollutants
also capture mercury (Pacyna et al. 2010). However, installing pollution capture
technology can result in lower plant efﬁciency (US EPA 2003). Thus, stringent air
quality policies increase the cost of combusting coal. Whether countries are willing
to pay for these additional costs is contingent on air quality’s political salience, as
well as the technical factors that increase costs, including the availability and
quality of coal resources.
In recent years, the Chinese public has become concerned about urban air
pollution and increasingly dissatisﬁed with the government’s regulation of
power plants (Zheng and Kahn 2013). In China, satisfaction with air quality
is below the global average, and Hong Kong has the lowest satisfaction in the
world (Loschky and Ray 2013). Citizens regularly monitor air quality, and
the recent pollution documentary Under the Dome was watched 200 million
times before being banned in March 2015.7 The Chinese government has sig-
naled that environmental problems are a potential threat to political stability
(Economy 2010). As a result, the central government has begun tightening air
quality regulations. Over the past ten years, the fraction of coal plants in China
with desulfurization systems capturing sulfur dioxide jumped from 14 to 86
percent (Zhang and Schreifels 2011). Further, in 2011, the Chinese Ministry
of Environmental Protection adopted a new standard for thermal power plants.
One Chinese negotiator described the standard as reﬂecting a movement toward
setting limits comprehensively for multiple pollutants—an approach common
in developed countries.8 Between 2012 and 2014, China adopted some of the
most stringent conventional air pollutants emissions limits globally for both
new and existing plants (Schreifels et al. 2012). These urban air pollution reg-
ulations will lead to substantial mercury reduction co-beneﬁts.
China is also directly targeting mercury emissions, mentioning them as a
goal in its most recent ﬁve-year plan. The 2011 Emission Standard included a
mercury-speciﬁc limit. One Chinese expert involved in domestic air policy said
the limit was set during the INC negotiations and is based on values used in
Germany.9 Complying with new air quality regulations, described above, will
require that almost all plants install several pollution control devices. Since
these devices also capture mercury, the coal experts we interviewed were con-
ﬁdent that most plants would be below the mercury emission limit without
mercury-speciﬁc control technologies.10 For these reasons, meeting the emissions
requirements under a mercury treaty was compatible with China’s existing actions,
particularly under ﬂexible implementation. Consequently, China sought to shape
the emissions article to ensure it conformed with domestic standards, did not
7. Daniel K. Gardner, China’s “Silent Spring” Moment? New York Times, March 18, 2015.
8. Interview with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014.
9. Interview with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014.
10. Interviews with Chinese negotiator, January 24, 2014; senior developed country negotiator,
January 17, 2014; EU member state negotiator, January 30, 2014.
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mandate reductions, and did not require mercury-speciﬁc control technologies.
With these changes, China would be able to comply.
In contrast, air pollution has been a lower public and regulatory priority in
India. Satisfaction with air quality in India is higher than in China, and higher
than the global average (Loschky and Ray 2013). This is not because air pollu-
tion is less of an objective problem in India; rather, it is not seen as a key prob-
lem for policy-makers to address (Hsu et al. 2014). Instead, issues such as food
insecurity, poverty, and access to basic services are priorities for the population.
Consequently, there has only been limited regulation of pollution from coal-
ﬁred power plants in India. Instead, improving urban air quality often centers
on transportation rather than electricity sources.
Furthermore, the characteristics of India’s power sector and domestic coal
quality present technical barriers to mercury regulations. Most coal used in India
is domestic, with higher ash and lower sulfur content than coal from other
countries (Kumari 2011; Sloss 2012b). The high ash content makes it less efﬁ-
cient, meaning India requires more coal for the same energy output, resulting in
higher mercury emissions. The low sulfur rates mean that sulfur dioxide con-
trols that also capture mercury have not been a regulatory priority (Sloss
2012a). Desulfurization controls are not common or required, and there are
no speciﬁc emissions limits for nitrogen oxides in India. Still, since 1981, emis-
sions limits for particulates have been in effect, leading to the use of electrostatic
precipitator technology at most plants. However, Indian coal’s high ash content
may reduce these systems’ ability to capturemercury (Sloss 2012b). Consequently,
in contrast to China, there are few opportunities for mercury co-beneﬁts in India.
Furthermore, India’s coal may be very high in mercury, higher than the coal in
China; however, with few measurements, this remains highly uncertain (UNEP
2011; UNEP 2014). But even the perception of high mercury content may have
presented barriers to India agreeing to emissions regulations in the negotiations.11
Unsurprisingly, recent power regulations have focused on improvements
to plant efﬁciency. In 2002, the Indian Central Pollution Control Board capped
the ash content of coals used in power generation at 34 percent, leading to in-
creased coal cleaning and blending. Coal cleaning also reduces mercury content.
Recent generation capacity expansion plans include the adoption of supercriti-
cal boilers in new installations—a technology with substantial efﬁciency gains
(ICEA 2012). Efﬁciency improvements will have beneﬁts for mercury, traditional
air pollutants, and carbon dioxide. However, these changes are likely to take
time, as they require modiﬁcations to fuels and both new and existing power
plants. Furthermore, during the negotiations, it was not clear whether efﬁciency
improvements would be seen as acceptable actions to control mercury under
the treaty, making India more hesitant to agree to the convention. If stricter
11. Interviews with coal expert, January 20, 2014; UNEP Chemicals Branch Programme Ofﬁcer,
April 1, 2014.
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standards were placed on new sources, this would further compound India’s
challenges with complying, given the planned coal expansion.
These domestic differences between India and China in their coal quality
and power sector attributes interacted with differences in air pollution politics.
In India, mandatory emissions obligations were a larger obstacle, requiring
end-of-pipe controls that would, in effect, be mercury-speciﬁc, rather than offering
co-beneﬁts. These differences may also help explain the increased emphasis that
Indian delegates put on the availability of ﬁnancial and technical assistance over
their Chinese counterparts, because complying with treaty obligations would
likely require larger additional costs in India.
Development Constraints
As emerging economies, China and India have prioritized development through
expanding energy capacity. Both countries have similar electricity mixes using
substantial amounts of coal. Thus, their mercury emissions trajectories depend
not only on mercury control technologies, but also on energy demand and
capacity expansion. As is also the case with climate actions, placing signiﬁcant
constraints on mercury emissions could hinder electricity expansion. These
shared interests could facilitate a coalition between China and India.
However, there are signiﬁcant differences in energy access between China
and India. One report projected that all of China will be electriﬁed in 2015, as
compared to 2030 in India (IEA 2010). Electriﬁcation is one of the govern-
ment’s major priorities because a quarter of the Indian population has no access
to electricity, with ongoing electricity shortages (Ahn and Graczyk 2012). India
brought up electriﬁcation needs in the INC process when mandatory emissions
limits were raised. As an Indian delegate stated during INC2, the country plans
to double its power capacity within the next ten years, largely through new coal
capacity, providing electricity for 100 million homes without power (ENB
2011b). The difference in energy access between China and India suggests that
India will continue to build signiﬁcant coal generation capacity into the future,
making mercury controls more costly.
In addition to the electriﬁcation differentials between India and China,
these countries have diverged considerably in terms of their development trajec-
tories over the past ten years. China’s growth rate has surpassed India’s, with per
capita GDP now twice as high in China than in India. Similarly, poverty is more
severe in India, with 33 percent living on less than $1.25 per day, as compared
to China’s 12 percent (World Bank 2009). China’s greater economic develop-
ment may be linked to a higher willingness to regulate air pollution, discussed
below. Further, China has shown a strong ability to proﬁt from manufacturing
new environmental technology (Lewis 2013). Thus, global environmental reg-
ulations may present greater economic opportunities for China than for India.
In contrast, several interviewees indicated that for both regulators and citizens in
India, other challenges like poverty reduction, electriﬁcation, and drinking water
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are greater priorities. In India, the mercury problem is typically viewed as one
for developed countries to address.12
Domestic Scientiﬁc and Technical Capacity
Although signiﬁcant research has focused on scientists’ roles in international ne-
gotiations through linked, global networks (Haas 1992; Kohler et al. 2012), and
on the importance of state capacity for environmental policy implementation
(Harrison and Kostka 2014), less attention has been paid to how variation in
domestic scientiﬁc capacity affects countries’ negotiating positions (Stokes and
Selin 2016). Countries can vary in their domestic knowledge on environmental
issues and in the degree to which that knowledge is integrated into policy-
making. Efforts within chemicals negotiations have focused on making scientiﬁc
assessments available to developing countries through regional workshops, which
can raise the salience of technical information to facilitate regime participation
(Selin 2006). Despite these global-scale efforts, however, dramatic differences still
exist in countries’ access to scientiﬁc and technical knowledge in environmental
regimes (Tijssen 2007).
Direct input from academics is an increasingly common part of China’s
policy-making process (Lewis and Gallagher 2014). Mercury control technolo-
gies and their scientiﬁc and technical implications became increasingly well-
known to the Chinese delegation over the INC process. Four out of 18 members
of the Chinese delegation at INC5 were air pollution and mercury scientists
from academia. As in North America and Europe, China beneﬁts from a large
group of domestic scientiﬁc researchers that focus on China-speciﬁc mercury is-
sues, such as its domestic coal characteristics, emissions inventories, fate and
transport, and human exposure.13 Furthermore, China hosted the 2009 Interna-
tional Conference on Mercury as a Global Pollutant (ICMGP), and a large num-
ber of the presentations focused on China, no doubt deepening scientiﬁc
knowledge of the mercury problem domestically. Research highlighted the ex-
tent of China’s local mercury challenges, including contaminated sites and mer-
cury exposure through rice (Feng and Qiu 2008; Jiang and Shi 2006). Research
has also demonstrated that, whereas Chinese emissions contribute signiﬁcantly
to deposition in other countries, China is the largest anthropogenic source of
mercury deposition within its own borders, making mercury emissions control
foremost a domestic issue (AMAP and UNEP 2013). This active scientiﬁc com-
munity participated in developing the new emission standard domestically, as
well as the Chinese position in international negotiations.
In contrast, in India the scientiﬁc community around mercury is far less
developed. According to one scientist, only three research groups in India are
12. Interviews with senior developed country negotiator, January 17, 2014; Indian power sector
expert, February 25, 2014.
13. Interviews with senior developed country negotiators, February 4, 2014.
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studyingmercury emissions.14 At ICMGP 2013, only two presentations focused on
India and were from Indian institutions, whereas 38 addressed China, with 34
from Chinese institutions. Domestically, there have been relatively few studies
of mercury impacts in India, though some NGOs have conducted studies of the
Singrauli region where mercury acutely affects some communities (Kumari 2011;
Sahu et al. 2012). These same groups have brought attention to the lack of India-
speciﬁc information about mercury emissions and mercury impacts. They have
suggested that the government is politically reluctant to develop or release mercury
information—for example, on domestic coals’ mercury content—because identi-
fying the scope of the problem could commit the government to responding.15
These gaps are partially being addressed through the UNEP Global Mercury Part-
nerships rather than domestically. Furthermore, in India, scientists and technical
experts on mercury seem to have less inﬂuence over government policy. For exam-
ple, none of the Indian delegates at INC5 were academic scientists. Instead, the
representatives came from the environmental and health ministries, the central
electricity authority, and diplomatic ministries. Consequently, the Indian delega-
tion did not have the same connection to scientiﬁc data when negotiating.
Scientiﬁc information can create shared narratives, forming a basis for
cooperation. Importantly, science may play different roles at different scales.
Domestic science—in this case, studies of the environmental and health effects
within a country’s borders—may have a strong inﬂuence on domestic regula-
tion, and therefore on countries’ positions. This was the case for China, which
began to converge more closely with the EU and US as Chinese ofﬁcials became
more knowledgeable about emissions inventories, the available technologies,
and their feasibility.16 International assessments, like those UNEP convenes,
may weave a global narrative upon which negotiations can be built, but this
information may be insufﬁcient to allow countries to understand their domestic
impacts. Instead, there is a need to foster domestic scientiﬁc communities that
can contribute to negotiators’ understanding of global environmental issues.
Conclusions
The North-South dichotomy in international environmental negotiations is
breaking down. In this article, we have explored the roots of South-South diver-
gence through a case study of China and India’s positions in the mercury nego-
tiations. We ﬁnd that attention to three main factors can help explain this
divergence: domestic resources and regulatory politics, development constraints,
and domestic scientiﬁc and technological capacity. The splitting of India’s and
China’s positions during the ﬁnal mercury negotiating session illustrates that
14. Interview with Indian environmental scientist, September 18, 2014.
15. Interview with Indian power sector expert, February 25, 2014.
16. Interviews with senior developed country negotiator, February 4, 2014; coal expert, January 20,
2014.
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countries’ positions can be highly dependent on socio-technical interactions.
Geopolitical considerations—for example, a domestic coal reserve’s attributes—
interact with technical considerations, such as pollutant control technologies, to
constrain domestic policy options and, thus, international cooperation. Fur-
thermore, the extent to which domestic science has framed the problem as
important to address can shape countries’ positions. Countries’ diverging devel-
opment statuses can further constrain cooperation.
In the past, developing countries gained additional power in negotiations
by coming to a common position, even if their underlying interests were not
perfectly aligned. However, as emerging economies gain greater negotiating
power and as variation in their development statuses increases, they are less
willing to work in large, negotiating blocs. These developments, occurring across
several international environmental negotiations, suggest a shift away from
multilateralism with large Northern and Southern coalitions, toward greater
bilateral cooperation. Althoughwe used themercury case to present our argument,
similar dynamics inﬂuence other negotiations, including those related to ozone
and climate.
In climate negotiations, the South has fragmented over time (Hurrell and
Sengupta 2012). At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the G77 cooperated to success-
fully argue for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. How-
ever, by Kyoto in 1997, tensions within the South had developed. On the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), Brazil split with China and India to support
the US proposal. Here, developing countries would be paid to reduce emissions,
with the resulting credits counting toward developed countries’ reduction
requirements. Although China and India eventually became large beneﬁciaries
under the CDM, they were initially skeptical. Once the CDM was implemented,
developing countries diverged further in their views on the mechanism’s effec-
tiveness. By 2007, the vast majority of CDM projects were located in China, India,
Mexico, and Brazil (Grifﬁth-Jones, Hedger, and Stokes 2009). Consequently,
smaller African and Latin American countries clashed with emerging economies
over whether to prioritize smaller-scale projects, as their interests were not aligned.
By Copenhagen in 2009, progress in the climate negotiations had largely stalled.
Since Copenhagen, while developing countries have maintained a common rhe-
toric on capacity building and ﬁnancial assistance, their domestic actions have
diverged. Roberts (2011) documented over thirteen distinct subgroups, with
divergent interests and positions.
China and the US have had bilateral negotiations since 2009 through an
annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue, which includes a climate change
working group. China is considering a cap on coal use as early as 2016, and
a cap on carbon with a peak emissions year as early as 2030. Further, since
2011, China has developed pilot emissions trading programs (Zhang et al.
2014). In part, China may be more willing to act on climate change because
of co-beneﬁts with air pollution, as happened with its mercury policy interests.
In addition, due to China’s development as a manufacturing economy, China
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stands to beneﬁt as an exporter of renewables and other low-carbon technology
(Lewis 2014).
In contrast, India has made fewer domestic climate commitments. Although
it has small energy efﬁciency and solar goals, India lacks a comprehensive climate
policy framework (Trancik et al. 2014). Also, while the US attempted to negotiate a
bilateral agreement with India, it failed to do so in early 2015. India’s plan for the
Paris negotiations targeted emissions intensity reductions rather than absolute
carbon cuts. Given India’s development status and extensive need for electriﬁca-
tion, India also stated that more coal power would be built. As in the mercury
negotiations, China’s and India’s interests have diverged in the climate regime
due to differences in development and domestic regulatory politics.
Within the ozone negotiations, developing countries cooperated during
the 1980s. Once the Montreal Protocol was ﬁnalized, it was unclear whether
China or India, both signiﬁcant chloroﬂuorocarbon consumers, would ratify
the agreement. China had been a productive negotiator, signaling a willingness
to sign the treaty, whereas India showed little interest in acting, and Indian
“ofﬁcials in private conversations had characterized the issue as a ‘rich man’s
problem—rich man’s solution’” (Benedick 1998, 100–101). Although coopera-
tion was sometimes fractious, the two countries largely shared positions on
ozone, both signing the Montreal Protocol. Still, the timing of each country’s
actions has been different: China ﬁrst ratiﬁed the Vienna Convention in 1989,
whereas India did not join until 1991. Similarly, China acted a year before India
on the Montreal Protocol and London amendments. On the Beijing amend-
ments, China signiﬁcantly lagged India, by seven years.
More recently, differences between China and India in the ozone negoti-
ations have become substantive, due to disagreements on HFCs, chemicals with
signiﬁcant global warming potential but lower ozone-depleting potential. Due
to HFCs’ climate effects, several countries, most notably the US, Canada, and
Mexico, proposed an amendment in 2010 to create an HFC phase-out (ENB
2010b). Initially, both China and India disagreed with phasing out HFCs in
either the ozone or climate negotiations. The issue was moved to the ozone
proceedings, with both countries continuing to resist a phase-out, arguing that
these were not ozone-depleting substances and that the alternatives had
signiﬁcant problems.
However, the emerging economies began to fracture from this common
position. China and Brazil, although not yet committing to a phase-out, sig-
naled a willingness to discuss HFCs in the ozone negotiations. In September
2013, at a G20 meeting, the US and China came to a bilateral understanding
that a contact group would be established in the ozone negotiations to discuss
costs, alternatives, and a potential HFC amendment to the Montreal Protocol.
China may see market opportunities in the switch away from HFCs, since it can
manufacture new alternatives (Hwang 2013). In contrast, India continued to
oppose action on HFCs under the ozone negotiations, given its large domestic
HFC industry. India was concerned that switching away from these chemicals
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could be a tactic for developed countries to proﬁt from HFC substitutes (ENB
2012). Eventually, in mid-2015, under pressure from the US, India agreed to a
compromise phase-down beginning in 2031—hardly an ambitious timeline.
Here again, differences in development and domestic industries played a role
in Southern countries’ diverging positions in the ozone regime.
Across international environmental negotiations, developing countries
have begun to hold diverging interests, and thereby, different positions. The
mercury, climate, and ozone negotiations suggest that underlying South-South
divisions have become apparent in the move from conceptual framing into spe-
ciﬁc regulatory regimes. As global environmental cooperation moves toward im-
plementation, underlying differences between Southern countries have become
clearer. Divergence can be partially attributed to interactions between politics,
technology, and resources. In the future, we predict that where technological
constraints divide emerging economies’ preferences, where scientiﬁc knowledge
is unequal, and where domestic resources and politics differ, we are more likely
to see disruptions to South-South coalitions. Normatively, our ﬁndings suggest
that building scientiﬁc capacity in developing countries and aligning global
requirements with domestic constraints can both be potential levers to increase
international cooperation. However, whether fracturing in the Southern
coalition will lead to better environmental outcomes remains to be seen.
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